

108
Greatest Of All Times



Globally selected
Personalities



He who cannot support himself,
cannot take his own decision.

— Gamal Abdel Nasser

15 Jan 1918 <::><::><::> 28 Sep 1970

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15 Jan 1918



28 Sep 1970

Gamal Abdel Nasser

- He was born in Alexandria on January 15, 1918.
- He joined the Military Academy in 1937 and graduated in July 1938. In 1940, he got promoted to First Lieutenant.
- He took Part in the 1948 Palestine War. Upon his return, he was appointed as a professor in the Command and Staff College after passing its exam.
- In June, 1949, the Free Officers Movement was confidentially formed in his house in Kobry El-Qubba. The Movement staged the July 23, 1952 Revolution that toppled King Farouk, and declared Egypt a republic in 1953.
- Being a member of the Egyptian Negotiation Delegation, he got the British approval to evacuate their troops from Egypt on October 19, 1954.
- He survived a failed assassination attempt while delivering a speech in Manshia Square, Alexandria, commemorating the British Military Withdrawal on October 26.
- He became the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt on June 23, 1956.
- He adopted the idea of establishing the High Dam, which represents a national epic that was made by Egyptians and is considered as the greatest engineering project in the twentieth century.
- On July 26, 1956, he announced the nationalization of the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal an Egyptian joint-stock company.

- On February 22, 1958, he declared the formation of the "United Arab Republic", a political union between Egypt and Syria, which he assumed its presidency.
- He announced his resignation from office on June 9, 1967. As a result, Egyptians marched to call on him to remain in office.
- He wrote several books, including: "The Philosophy of the Revolution", "Yawmyat El-Ra'ys Gamal Abdel Nasser fi Harb Felsteen" (President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Journals on the Palestine War), and "Fi Sabeel El-Horeya" (For the Sake of Freedom).
- He passed away on September 28, 1970.
- His death left Egypt and the Arab world in a state of shock. His funeral was the greatest funeral in the twentieth century; millions took to the streets to be part of the funeral in the presence of heads of Arab countries. The Arab world mourned his death; thousands of people from all over the Arab world poured into the streets of their major cities.

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Kindly visit the following Web Links for MORE information

<https://nasser.bibalex.org/Home/Home.aspx?lang=ar>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamal_Abdel_Nasser

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gamal-Abdel-Nasser/Nassers-accomplishments>

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>

<https://jacobin.com/2021/11/egypt-gamal-abdel-nasser-world-politics-arab-socialism-anti-imperialism-history>

Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser Changed World Politics



Suez Crisis, which catapulted the popularity of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser — and became symbolic of his large and complicated legacy of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and anti-imperialism.



amal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt (1954–70) and champion of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and anti-imperialism in the era of global decolonization, was the first indigenous ruler of Egypt since Cleopatra. He believed that he spoke for — and viscerally understood — the interests of its people. Addressing them in unembellished semi-colloquial language, the Egyptian leader urged them, “*Irfa' ra'sak ya khuya*” (“lift up your head my brother”).

The balance among consent, acquiescence, and coercion in the making of Nasser's project was uncertain and shifted over time. Some — like his successor, Anwar al-Sadat (1970–81), and the renowned liberal litterateur Tawfiq al-Hakim — supported him in power yet denounced him as a dictator in death. Marxists labelled Nasser as a fascist in the early 1950s but acclaimed him in the 1960s and even after he had died.

An Officers' Republic

Egypt's political transformation from an aristocratic constitutional monarchy to an “[officers' republic](#)” is Nasser's most enduring legacy today. This regime-form persists despite the realignment of Egypt's domestic and foreign policies, and shifts in the balance of power among the elements of its ruling bloc — the army, the internal-security apparatus,

the state bourgeoisie, and, since the 1970s, private sector crony capitalists.

From the mid-1950s until (and even after) his death, Nasser's personal charisma and appeal to pan-Arab nationalism cast a long shadow over Arab politics. Consequently, Egypt established the template for military republics that styled themselves as anti-imperialist or socialist in Syria, Iraq, Algeria, North Yemen, Libya, and Sudan — all authoritarian states with repressive internal-security apparatuses that policed society, culture, and intellectual life, and crushed all opposition movements.

Why did many Marxists in the era of decolonization consider Nasser's Egypt and similar regimes of the Global South to be progressive or even socialist? Decolonization was the principal historical dynamic of this era. The international left did not understand well the domestic social structures of anti-imperialist regimes or discuss this issue seriously. The Soviet Union promoted illusions about its Cold War allies, which encouraged a tendency to disregard the distinction between an anti-imperialist foreign policy and domestic authoritarianism.

In many countries of the Global South, militaries were the largest disciplined, modern, national-scale institutions. They often allied with (or even led) anti-colonial forces, and were well-positioned to seize power in their own names and then repress dissent in the name of unity against the imperialist enemy. Nasserists often deployed the slogan "No voice louder than the voice of the battle" (against Israel) in this way. The deep divisions on the Left over how to understand Bashar al-Assad's Syria today are an historical legacy of this dynamic.

Nasser's Generation

Nasser belonged to the first cohort of lower-middle-class cadets who were admitted to the military academy in 1936. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of that year reduced the scope of the semicolonial military occupation that had been installed following Britain's 1882 invasion of Egypt. Nonetheless, British interests prevailed on the most critical issues, as the incident of February 4, 1942 revealed.

That day, as the troops of German field marshal Erwin Rommel were advancing toward Alexandria, British tanks surrounded the royal palace in Cairo. The British ambassador strode in and demanded that King Farouk either abdicate or dismiss the current cabinet, which the British considered too sympathetic to the Axis, and invite Mustafa al-Nahhas, leader of the staunchly anti-fascist Wafd Party, to form a new government. Farouk capitulated.

After World War II, British forces continued to occupy the Suez Canal Zone. Thus, Nasser and his generation came of age politically in the struggle to achieve the “total evacuation” of British forces and Egypt’s “full independence.” Nasser believed that the army must take the initiative to expel the British, destroy the power of their local collaborators, and reform politics and society. To accomplish these goals, following Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Nasser formed and led the Free Officers Movement.

On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers executed a nearly bloodless military coup against King Farouk; three days later, they ordered Farouk to abdicate and leave Egypt. With the exception of the ruling class — the monarchy, the large landowners, the local urban business class, and their legal and journalistic auxiliaries — most Egyptians welcomed the officers’ “blessed movement,” as it was styled.

Stress Tests

Nasser and the great majority of the Free Officers were resolutely anti-communist. Several, most famously Anwar al-Sadat (and briefly Nasser himself), had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood before joining the Free Officers. In contrast, one of the junta leaders, Khaled Muhyi al-Din, and several lower-ranking officers were close to the Marxist Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL).

The Muslim Brotherhood and the DMNL initially supported the coup (all the other Marxist organizations opposed it). However, both groups became its enemies within a year and their members consequently suffered repeated imprisonment and torture.

The new regime's first stress test was a bloody encounter with striking textile workers at a large mill fifteen miles south of Alexandria, which exposed its fear of popular initiatives. On August 13, 1952, the army intervened to quash the strike. Soldiers responded to shots of unknown provenance by firing on demonstrating workers who were chanting slogans in favor of the new regime, resulting in casualties on both sides.

The military junta, anxious to assure the US embassy that they were not communists, hustled twenty-nine workers before a hastily assembled military tribunal. Two of them, Mustafa Khamis and Muhammad al-Baqari, were convicted of premeditated murder and of being communists. The court sentenced them to death. Khamis may have been a Marxist, but he was not present when the shots were fired; al-Baqari was not an activist. Both men were executed on September 7, 1952.

Land Reform

In 1952, Egypt was an overwhelmingly agricultural country. Its principal source of wealth was the cultivation and export of premium-quality cotton. The great majority of the rural population were malnourished, illiterate, and afflicted with disease — especially schistosomiasis, which they contracted from parasites inhabiting the still waters of irrigation ditches where they worked barefoot for hours at a time.

In the last years of the monarchy, wealth and political power were concentrated in the hands of twelve thousand large landowning families who comprised less than 0.5 percent of the rural population and owned about 35 percent of the arable land. At the bottom of the agrarian class structure, 60 percent of all rural households neither owned nor rented land and worked as wage laborers, while 2 million families, 72 percent of all landowners, owned plots of less than one feddan (1.04 acres), barely enough for subsistence.

The Free Officers' program promised to eliminate "feudalism," an imprecise term for the economic and political power of the large landowners. To accomplish this, they decreed a modest land reform — less radical than comparable post–World War II measures adopted under US supervision in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The Free Officers' program promised to eliminate 'feudalism,' an imprecise term for the economic and political power of the large landowners.

The Land Reform Law of September 9, 1952 limited individual ownership to two hundred feddans and three hundred feddans for a family — very large holdings by Egyptian standards. Initially, some seventeen hundred landowners, including 425 members of the royal family, lost 10 percent of Egypt's arable land.

By 1970, 15 percent of the arable land had been redistributed. The landless population had declined to 43 percent of rural households, and the share of the agricultural income received by wage workers and owners of less than five feddans had doubled.

Medium and rich peasants with access to credit to buy additional land were the main beneficiaries of the land redistribution. The key provisions of the law that raised the rural standard of living were a limit on agrarian rents, to no more than seven times the value of the annual tax on the land, and an agricultural minimum wage.

A World Leader

The land reform and the banning of the political parties of the old regime in January 1953 broke the power of Egypt's monarchy-era ruling class. Now seeing itself as a revolutionary leadership, the junta began calling itself the Revolutionary Command Council.

However, the revolution had no coherent economic policy or political ideology. It had not been installed in power by a popular social movement or party; nor was it accountable to any such movement. Nasser consolidated power in his hands by outmanoeuvring his rivals in March 1954. He secured his supremacy several months later when he fulfilled a major promise by signing a treaty securing the evacuation of British forces by June 1956.

Nasser's role as a leader of the Arab world and the struggle of the Global South — then more commonly referred to as the [Third World](#) — to forge an alternative to the Cold War framing of international politics was arguably more historically consequential than his domestic accomplishments.

He unhesitatingly supported [Algeria's National Liberation Front \(FLN\)](#) when it launched a war for independence from France on November 1, 1954, providing the movement with an office in Cairo, a radio station, training, and arms. Using Egypt's powerful "Voice of the Arabs" radio station, in early 1955 Nasser broadcast direct appeals to the Arab peoples, over the heads of their governments, urging them to reject the Anglo-American sponsored anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact. This intervention scuppered the planned adherence of Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia (although Turkey and Iraq did join).

Nasser first appeared on a global stage at the April 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries. The inspiration for the Bandung gathering came from the principles of "positive neutralism" promoted by Indonesia's president Sukarno and the prime ministers of India and China, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai. Positive neutralism proposed a world order based on anti-colonialism, nonaggression, and mutual noninterference in domestic affairs as an alternative to the Cold War blocs.

Although the Bandung Conference is commonly remembered as being more radical than it actually was, it did symbolize the advent of the Third World as an international political force. Nasser contributed to the formation of this historical current and rode the wave successfully for over a decade.

Confrontation Over Suez

Despite Nasser's anti-communism, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration refused to sell arms to Egypt. Zhou Enlai encouraged Nasser to turn to the Soviet bloc, and on September 27, 1955, Egypt announced an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, the first weapons sale by any non-Western power to a Middle Eastern country.

Hoping to woo Egypt back to the Western camp, the United States and Britain agreed to finance construction of the Aswan High Dam, a top-priority development project comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority. But the Manichean worldview of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles could not tolerate Nasser's continued advocacy and practice of positive neutralism. On July 18, 1956, Dulles retracted the US offer in an intentionally insulting note to Egypt.

Nasser countered more boldly than anyone had anticipated by [nationalizing the Suez Canal](#). The Canal was a concessionary company owned and operated by a multinational firm headquartered in Paris in which the British government held 44 percent of shares. His [announcement](#) electrified the Egyptian people, the Arab region, and the entire Third World:

The Suez Canal was a symbol of despotism, a symbol of rape, and a symbol of humiliation. Today, citizens, the Suez Canal has been nationalised . . . the income of the Suez Canal is 35 million [Egyptian] pounds — \$100 million a year, or \$500 million in five years. So, we don't need to consider the \$70 million in US or British aid. With this, we feel pride, we feel dignity, and we feel that we are really building our homeland as we want . . . we build what we want, and we do what we want.

France had been supplying Israel with tanks, aircraft, and nuclear technology since 1954, partly because Egypt's support for Algeria's independence had aroused its ire. In retaliation for the nationalization of the Canal, the French government persuaded Britain to join a Franco-Israeli alliance in attacking Egypt on October 29, 1956 — the "tripartite aggression," as Egyptians call it.

Israel easily conquered the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula and proclaimed its intention to annex these territories. But US and Soviet pressure forced Israel and its European allies to withdraw. Despite its military defeat, Egypt emerged from the war unbowed and in control of the Suez Canal — an enormous political victory. Nasser towered over the Arab rulers who meekly accepted Western colonial or postcolonial domination.

Syria's political leaders sought to leverage Nasser's prestige by offering to unite with Egypt. Nasser reluctantly assumed responsibility for a fractious Syria; he felt obliged to agree to the proposed union to preserve his leadership in the Arab world and the ideal of pan-Arab unity. The United Arab Republic (UAR) was established in February 1958.

Arab Socialism

Nasser began, with no plan at first, to build a large public sector by nationalizing the property of all British, French, and Belgian nationals after the tripartite aggression. Then in 1960, because the local business classes refrained from investing in industry, Nasser nationalized Banque Misr and all its associated industrial, financial, and commercial concerns and adopted a five-year plan.

The July 1961 "socialist decrees" nationalized most nonagricultural enterprises and lowered the ceiling on agricultural land ownership for an individual to a hundred feddans (then fifty feddans in 1969). In 1962, the National Charter proclaimed Arab socialism as the official ideology of the state and established the Arab Socialist Union as its sole party.

Arab socialism, like African socialism and other anti-Marxist varieties of socialism in the Third World, pursued economic development following the Soviet model of rapid industrialization while also raising the level of consumption of the popular classes. Egypt did not have sufficient capital to realize this project without expropriating the large landowners and pursuing a more radical agrarian reform. But Nasser opposed mobilizing the peasant majority for a class struggle against the pillars of the old regime.

Egyptian Arab socialism mimicked many other aspects of Soviet rule, including its most unsavoury antidemocratic practices. High-ranking officers with little economic experience became managers of large public-sector firms, forming an often inept or corrupt state bourgeoisie.

Arab socialism bettered the lives of workers in public enterprises and the state bureaucratic apparatus, who obtained stable employment and social benefits like health care and pensions. All Egyptians received subsidized basic commodities and free public education from kindergarten to

university level, while children of workers and peasants gained much greater access to higher education.

The Limits of Nasserism

However, vast inequalities of wealth remained. Relations of production on the factory floor did not change much; in some instances, militaristic authoritarianism replaced private-sector paternalism. Rich peasants dominated the countryside, often exercising nominally illegal coercion against poor peasants and agricultural wage workers.

The Egyptian Marxists were too few, too disunited, and too distant from the peasant majority to pose an alternative to Nasser's regime. Several Egyptian Marxists living in France published book-length critiques of Nasserist Arab socialism, such as Anouar Abdel-Malek, Samir Amin, and Mahmoud Hussein. But a combination of repression, wishful thinking, and adherence to the Soviet line that Egypt was on a "noncapitalist path of development" disabled the critical faculties of those living in Egypt itself.

On January 1, 1959, the Nasser regime imprisoned nearly every Egyptian communist, subjecting them to harsh tortures until their release in 1964. Nonetheless, from their desert prison camps the communists hailed the "socialist decrees." By adopting Arab socialism without their participation, Nasser successfully outmaneuvered the communists and rendered them superfluous. The two parties dissolved themselves in 1965, just when the Nasserist project had reached its limits.

The socialist decrees prompted an alliance of Syria's business class and its military to rebel and secede from the UAR in September 1961. The following year, to shore up his standing in the Arab arena, Nasser encouraged a coup by the North Yemeni Free Officers against the Imam-King and sent the Egyptian army to back them up when Saudi forces intervened to restore the monarchy. North Yemen became Egypt's Vietnam, with up to seventy thousand soldiers and airmen engaged there until 1970.

Because of the army's poor performance in North Yemen, Nasser and Abdel Hakim Amer, chief of staff of the army and Nasser's closest friend since the 1930s, knew that Egypt was unprepared for a war. Amer had

undermined military discipline and preparedness by plying the officer corps with privileges and perks and building a patronage network more loyal to him than to Nasser.

Nasser's affection for Amer and his apprehension that the army would obey Amer in a crisis, not him, prevented the Egyptian leader from holding Amer to account for the failures of the army. In May 1967, acting without Nasser's approval, Amer recklessly dispatched two divisions into the Sinai Peninsula.

This ultimately provoked Israel into attacking Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on June 5. Israel's victory in the June War of 1967 devastated the Egyptian forces to an even greater extent than in their previous two wars.

A New Era

On June 9, [Nasser offered to resign](#) and retire from politics. In response, masses of Egyptians poured into the streets of Cairo demanding that Nasser remain as their president — although there is reason to believe that Nasser's lieutenants orchestrated these demonstrations.

While ostensibly a show of support, the demonstrations highlighted Nasser's greatest weakness. He convinced or coerced the Egyptian people to entrust all major decisions to him. In a moment of crisis, they had no confidence in their own agency.

Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war squandered the country's international standing, overburdened its economy, and heralded the demise of Arab socialism and pan-Arab nationalism, exacerbated by Israel's crushing of Egypt's wartime ally, Syria. An Arab new left sought to fill the political void, inspired by the Palestinian armed resistance that was led by Yasser Arafat's Fatah and its (at least nominally) Marxist rivals, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

The March 1968 Battle of Karameh popularized this new political horizon: fighters from Fatah and the Jordanian army inflicted heavy losses on an Israeli force that had penetrated deep into Jordan. This Arab victory,

although it was tactical rather than strategic, inspired hundreds from all over the Arab world to volunteer to fight with Fatah against Israel.

Nasser effectively relinquished Egypt's former leadership in the struggle for Palestine to the armed Palestinian resistance. In July 1968, he brought Arafat to Moscow with him and introduced him to the Soviet leadership; six months later, Nasser acquiesced to Arafat becoming the chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Executive Committee.

Nasser's Legacy

On February 21, 1968, Egyptian workers and students launched the first large demonstrations against the Nasser regime since 1954, prompted by the lenient sentences handed down to commanders of the air force on trial for their incompetence in the 1967 war. Ultimately the protesters articulated more fundamental demands for freedom of expression, democracy, and restraints on the power of the internal security forces.

The demonstrations continued for nearly a week: two workers were killed and sixty-seven civilians were wounded in clashes with the police. Whether or not Nasser personally ordered the air force to fire on students in Alexandria to quash the demonstrations — as at least one writer, Hisham al-Salamuni, claims — those shots underscored the failure of Nasser's Arab Socialist project.

Nonetheless, Nasser's personal prestige remained substantial enough for him to mediate the November 1969 Cairo Agreement. The agreement gave the PLO responsibility for Lebanon's three hundred thousand Palestinian refugees and set the terms on which the Lebanese authorities would tolerate Palestinian attacks on Israel. At the September 1970 Arab League summit, he worked long hours to secure a ceasefire which ended the Palestinian-Jordanian civil war and arranged the evacuation of the armed Palestinian groups from Jordan to Lebanon.

The intensive diplomacy of that effort over-taxed Nasser's health, which, unknown to the public, had been poor for years. The strain resulted in a fatal heart attack on September 28, 1970.

Gamal Abdel Nasser exemplified the aspirations of the formerly colonized countries of the Global South to assert their sovereign interests in a non-bipolar world. His international achievements simultaneously defined and were enabled by the historical era of decolonization and its limits. Nasser established an emotional bond with the Egyptian people and bettered many of their lives. But his lack of confidence in them led to his failure as their leader.

<https://jacobin.com/2021/11/egypt-gamal-abdel-nasser-world-politics-arab-socialism-anti-imperialism-history>

CONTRIBUTORS

Joel Beinin is a professor emeritus of history at Stanford University and a member of the US Committee to End Political Repression in Egypt. His latest book is *Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Popular Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt* (Stanford University Press, 2016).

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Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein

جمال عبد الناصر حسين



Portrait of Gamal Abdel Nasser

2nd President of Egypt
1st President of the United Arab Republic (UAR)

In office

23 June 1956 – 28 September 1970

Vice President

[Anwar Sadat](#)(1969–1970)

[Ali Sabri](#)(1965–1968)

[Zakaria Mohieddine](#)(1961–1967)

[Hussein el-Shafei](#)(1961–1965)

[Kamal el-Din Hussein](#)(1961–1964)

[Abdel Hakim Amer](#)(1958–1965)

[Abdel Latif Boghdadi](#) (1958-1962)

[Akram al-Hawrani](#)(1958–1960)

Preceded by

[Mohamed Naguib](#)

Succeeded by

[Anwar Sadat](#)

2nd [Secretary General of Non-Aligned Movement](#)

In office

5 October 1964 – 8 September 1970

Preceded by

[Josip Broz Tito](#)

Succeeded by

[Kenneth Kaunda](#)

2nd [Chairman of the Organization of African Unity](#)

In office

17 July 1964 – 21 October 1965

Preceded by

[Haile Selassie](#)

Succeeded by

[Kwame Nkrumah](#)

[Prime Minister of United Arab Republic](#)

In office

1 February 1958 – 29 September 1962

Succeeded by	Ali Sabri
Prime Minister of Egypt	
In office	
18 April 1954 – 1 February 1958	
Preceded by	Muhammad Naguib
Vice Chairman of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)	
In office	
23 July 1952 – 23 June 1954	
Personal details	
Born	15 January 1918 Alexandria, Egypt
Died	28 September 1970 (aged 52) Cairo , Egypt
Nationality	Egyptian
Political party	Arab Socialist Union
Spouse(s)	Tahia Kazem
Children	Hoda Abdel Nasser Mona Abdel Nasser Khalid Abdel Nasser (deceased) Abdel Hamid Abdel Nasser Abdel Hakim Abdel Nasser
Occupation	Military instructor
Military service	
Branch/service	Egyptian Army
Years of service	1938–1952
Rank	Colonel
Battles/wars	1948 Arab-Israeli War

Some Historic Pictures



Nasser (center) with [Ahmed Mazhar](#) (left) in army, 1940



Nasser (first from left) with his unit in the [Faluja pocket](#), displaying weapons captured from the Israeli Army during the 1948 war.



The Free Officers after the coup, 1953. Counterclockwise: [Zakaria Mohieddin](#), [Abdel Latif Boghdadi](#), [Kamel el-Din Hussein](#) (standing), Nasser (seated), [Abdel Hakim Amer](#), [Mohamed Naguib](#), [Youssef Seddik](#), and Ahmad Shawki.



Leaders of Egypt following the ouster of King Farouk, November 1952. Seated, left to right: [Sulayman Hafez](#), [Mohamed Naguib](#) and Nasser



Nasser (right) and [Mohamed Naguib](#) (left) during celebrations marking the second anniversary of the 1952 revolution, July 1954



Nasser and Naguib saluting at the opening of the [Suez Canal](#)



Nasser greeted by crowds in Alexandria one day after his announcement of the British withdrawal and the assassination attempt against him, 27 October 1954.



President Nasser receives a delegation of Christian bishops from [Dakahlia](#), [Qena](#), [Qus](#) and [Sohag](#) (1965)



Nasser submitting his vote for the referendum of the proposed constitution, 23 June 1956



Nasser and [Imam Ahmad](#) of [North Yemen](#) facing the camera, Prince [Faisal of Saudi Arabia](#) in white robes in the background, [Amin al-Husayni](#) of the [All-Palestine Government](#) in the foreground at the [Bandung Conference](#), April 1955



Nasser raising the Egyptian flag over the Suez Canal city of Port Said to celebrate the final British military withdrawal from the country, June 1956



Nasser giving a speech at the opening of the Suez Canal



The signing of the regional defense pact between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan, January 1957. At the forefront, from left right: Prime Minister Sulayman al-Nabulsi of Jordan, King Hussein of Jordan, King Saud of Saudi Arabia, Nasser, Prime Minister Sabri al-Asali of Syria



Nasser seated alongside Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr of North Yemen (center) and Shukri al-Quwatli (right), February 1958. North Yemen joined the UAR to form the United Arab States, a loose confederation.



Nasser (right) and Lebanese president Fuad Chehab (to Nasser's right) at the Syrian-Lebanese border during talks to end the crisis in Lebanon. Akram al-Hawrani stands third to Nasser's left, and Abdel Hamid Sarraj stands to Chehab's right, March 1959.



Nasser waving to crowds in [Damascus](#), Syria, October 1960



Nasser before Yemeni crowds on his arrival to [Sana'a](#), April 1964. In front of Nasser and giving a salute is Yemeni President [Abdullah al-Sallal](#)



Nasser (center) receiving Algerian president [Ahmed Ben Bella](#) (right) and Iraqi president [Abdel Salam Aref](#) (left) for the [Arab League summit](#) in Alexandria, September 1964. Ben Bella and Aref were close allies of Nasser.



Government officials attending [Friday prayers](#) at [al-Azhar Mosque](#), 1959. From left to right; Interior Minister [Zakaria Mohieddin](#), Nasser, Social Affairs Minister [Hussein el-Shafei](#) and National Union Secretary [Anwar Sadat](#)



Nasser being sworn in for a second term as Egypt's president, 25 March 1965



Nasser (center), King [Hussein of Jordan](#) (left) and Egyptian Army Chief of Staff [Abdel Hakim Amer](#) (right) at the [Supreme Command of the Armed Forces](#) headquarters in Cairo before signing a [mutual defense pact](#), 30 May 1967



Egyptian demonstrators protesting Nasser's resignation, 1967



Nasser observing the Suez front with Egyptian officers during the 1968 War of Attrition. General Commander Mohamed Fawzi is directly behind Nasser, and to their left is Chief of Staff Abdel Moneim Riad, November 1968



Nasser brokering a ceasefire between Yasser Arafat of the PLO (left) and King Hussein of Jordan (right) at the emergency Arab League summit in Cairo on 27 September 1970, one day before Nasser's death



Nasser's funeral procession attended by five million mourners in Cairo, 1 October 1970

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Portrayal in film

In 1963, Egyptian director Youssef Chahine produced the film El Nasser Salah El Dine ("Saladin The Victorious"), which intentionally drew parallels between Saladin, considered a hero in the Arab world,

and Nasser and his pan-Arabist policies. Nasser is played by [Ahmed Zaki](#) in [Mohamed Fadel](#)'s 1996 [Nasser 56](#). The film set the Egyptian box office record at the time, and focused on Nasser during the Suez Crisis. It is also considered a milestone in [Egyptian](#) and [Arab cinema](#) as the first film to dramatize the role of a modern-day Arab leader. Together with the 1999 Syrian [biopic](#) *Gamal Abdel Nasser*, the films marked the first biographical movies about contemporary public figures produced in the Arab world. He is portrayed by Amir Boutros in the [Netflix](#) television series [The Crown](#).

'Saladin the Victorious'

Saladin the Victorious, also known as *Saladin and the Great Crusades* ([Arabic](#): الناصر صلاح الدين, *Al Nasser Salah Ad-Din*), is a 1963 [Egyptian epic film](#) directed by [Youssef Chahine](#). It is co-written by Chahine, [Yusuf Sibai](#) and others, based on a novel by [Naguib Mahfouz](#). The film features an [ensemble cast](#). It stars [Ahmed Mazhar](#), [Salah Zulfikar](#), [Nadia Lutfi](#), Omar El-Hariri, [Mahmoud El-Meliguy](#), [Leila Fawzi](#), Hamdi Gheiss, Ahmed Luxor, [Hussein Riad](#), [Laila Taher](#) and Zaki Toleimat.

It was entered into the [3rd Moscow International Film Festival](#). The film was restored to its original running time of 186 minutes from the original negative by the [Cineteca di Bologna](#) and was shown at [Il Cinema Ritrovato](#) in June 2019. *Saladin the Victorious* is one of the Top 100 Egyptian films.

Al Nasser Salah Ad-Din



English cover

Directed by	Youssef Chahine
Written by	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ezz El-Dine Zulficar• Mohamed Abdel Gawad• Youssef Chahine (screenplay)• Abd al-Rahman Sharqawi (screenplay)• Yusuf Sibai (story)• Naguib Mahfouz (novel)
Produced by	Assia Dagher
Starring	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ahmed Mazhar• Salah Zulfikar• Nadia Lutfi
Cinematography	Wadeed Sirry
Edited by	Rachida Abdel Salam
Music by	Angelo Francesco Lavagnino
Production companies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lotus Films

SUEZ Crisis

<https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis>

The Suez Crisis began on October 29, 1956, when Israeli armed forces pushed into Egypt toward the Suez Canal, a valuable waterway that controlled two-thirds of the oil used by Europe.

In July of that year, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal. The Israelis were joined by French and British forces, which damaged their relationships with the United States and nearly brought the Soviet Union into the conflict. In the end, Egypt emerged victorious, and the British, French and Israeli governments withdrew their troops in late 1956 and early 1957. The event was a pivotal event among Cold War superpowers.

Suez Canal Nationalized

The Suez Canal was built in Egypt under the supervision of French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps and was run jointly by a British-French organization. The man-made waterway—which opened in 1869 after ten years of construction—separates most of Egypt from the Sinai Peninsula.

At 120 miles long, the Suez Canal connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean by way of the Red Sea, allowing goods to be shipped between Europe and Asia more directly. Its value to international trade made it a nearly instant source of conflict among Egypt's neighbors—and Cold War superpowers vying for dominance.

The catalyst for the joint Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt was the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in July 1956. The situation had been brewing for some time.

Two years earlier, in the wake of World War II, the Egyptian military had begun pressuring the British to end their colonial-era military presence (which had been granted in the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty) in the canal zone. Nasser's armed forces also engaged in sporadic



battles with Israeli soldiers along the border between the two countries, and the Egyptian leader did nothing to conceal his antipathy toward the Zionist nation.

Supported by [Soviet](#) arms and money, and furious with the United States for reneging on a promise to provide funds for construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile River, Nasser ordered the Suez Canal seized and nationalized, arguing tolls from the ships passing through the canal would pay for the Aswan Dam.

The British were angered by the move and, during secret military consultations, sought the support of the French (who believed that Nasser was supporting rebels in the French colony of Algeria) and of neighboring [Israel](#) for an armed assault to retake the canal.

[Suez Crisis Begins](#)

The Israelis struck first on October 29, 1956. Two days later, British and French military forces joined them. Originally, forces from the three countries were set to strike at once, but the British and French troops were delayed.

Behind schedule but ultimately successful, the British and French troops landed at Port Said and Port Fuad and took control of the area around the Suez Canal. However, their hesitation had given the Soviet Union—also confronted with a growing crisis in Hungary—time to respond.

The Soviets, eager to exploit Arab nationalism and gain a foothold in the Middle East, supplied arms from Czechoslovakia to the Egyptian government beginning in 1955, and eventually helped Egypt construct the Aswan Dam on the Nile River after the United States refused to support the project.

Soviet leader [Nikita Khrushchev](#) railed against the invasion and threatened to rain down nuclear missiles on Western Europe if the triple Israeli-French-British force did not withdraw.

[America Intervenes](#)

The response of [President Dwight Eisenhower](#) and his administration was measured. It warned the Soviets that reckless talk of nuclear conflict would only make matters worse, and cautioned Khrushchev to refrain from direct intervention in the conflict.

However, Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also issued stern warnings to the French, British and Israelis to give up their campaign and withdraw from Egyptian soil. Eisenhower was upset with the British in particular for not keeping the United States informed about their intentions.

The United States threatened all three nations with economic sanctions if they persisted in their attack. The threats did their work: British and French forces withdrew by December, and Israel finally bowed to U.S. pressure, relinquishing control over the canal to Egypt, which [reopened the Suez Canal canal in March 1957](#).

The Suez Crisis marked the first use of a [United Nations](#) peacekeeping force. The [United Nations Emergency Force](#) (UNEF) was an armed group dispatched to the area to supervise the end of hostilities and the withdrawal of the three occupying forces.

Aftermath of the Suez Crisis

In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Britain and France—once the seat of vast colonial empires—found their influence as world powers weakened as the United States and Soviet Union took a more powerful role in global affairs. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden resigned two months after withdrawing British troops.

The crisis made Nasser a powerful hero in the growing Arab and Egyptian nationalist movements. Israel, while it did not gain the right to utilize the canal, was once again granted rights to ship goods along the Straits of Tiran.

Ten years later, Egypt again shut down the canal following the [Six-Day War](#) in June 1967. For almost a decade, the Suez Canal became the front line between the Israeli and Egyptian armies. In 1975, as a gesture of peace, Egyptian President [Anwar el-Sadat](#) reopened the Suez Canal. Today, about 300 million tons of goods pass through the canal each year.



Suez Crisis: British occupation of Port Said
British soldiers supervising a crowd in Port Said, Egypt,
while food is distributed during the Suez Crisis, November 12, 1956.

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Suez-Crisis>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Suez_Canal_obstruction

Personal Life



Nasser and his family in Manshiyat al-Bakri, 1963. From left to right, his daughter Mona, his wife [Tahia Kazem](#), daughter Hoda, son Abdel Hakim, son [Khaled](#), son Abdel Hamid, and Nasser.


In 1944, Nasser married [Tahia Kazem](#) (1920 – 25 March 1992), the daughter of a wealthy [Iranian](#) father and an Egyptian mother, both of whom had died when she was young. She had been introduced to Nasser through her brother, Abdel Hamid Kazim, a merchant friend of Nasser's, in 1943. After their wedding, the couple moved into a house in Manshiyat al-Bakri, a suburb of Cairo, where they lived for the rest of their lives. Nasser's entry into the officer corps in 1937 secured him relatively well-paid employment in a society where most people lived in poverty. Nasser and Tahia would sometimes discuss politics at home, but for the most part Nasser kept his career separate from his family life. He preferred to spend most of his free time with his children.

Nasser and Tahia had two daughters and three sons:

- Hoda, b. 1945.
- Mona, b. 1947.
- [Khalid](#), (13 December 1949 – 15 September 2011). The most active politically. Said to have co-founded (with Egyptian diplomat Mahmud Nur Eddin) an organization called "the Revolution of Egypt," which was accused of assassinating Israeli members of the Shin Bet stationed in Egypt in the late 1980s. Khalid took refuge in Yugoslavia and was eventually pardoned by President Hosni Mubarek.
- Abd al-Hamid, b. 1951.
- Abd al-Hakim, b. 1955. Appears regularly in Egyptian and regional media, heads the museum dedicated to the life of his father.



Although he was a proponent of secular politics, Nasser was an observant Muslim who made the [Haji](#) pilgrimage to [Mecca](#) in 1954 and 1965. He was known to be personally incorruptible, a characteristic which further enhanced his reputation among the citizens of Egypt and the Arab world. Nasser's personal hobbies included playing chess, photography, watching American films, reading Arabic, English, and French magazines, and listening to classical music.



Nasser practices photography at his home in Cairo, 1969

Nasser was a [chain smoker](#). He maintained 18-hour workdays and rarely took time off for vacations. The combination of smoking and working long hours contributed to his poor health. He was diagnosed with diabetes in the early 1960s and by the time of his death in 1970, he also had [arteriosclerosis](#), [heart disease](#), and [high blood pressure](#). He suffered two major [heart attacks](#) (in 1966 and 1969), and was on [bed rest](#) for six weeks after the second episode. State media reported that Nasser's absence from the public view at that time was a result of [influenza](#).

Legacy

Nasser made Egypt fully independent of [British influence](#), and the country became a major power in the [developing world](#) under his leadership. One of Nasser's main domestic efforts was to establish [social justice](#), which he deemed a prerequisite to [liberal democracy](#). During his presidency, ordinary citizens enjoyed unprecedented access to housing, education, jobs, health services and nourishment, as well as other forms of [social welfare](#), while [feudalistic](#) influence waned.

However, these advances came at the expense of civil liberties. In Nasser's Egypt, the media were tightly controlled, mail was opened, and telephones were wiretapped. He was elected in 1956, 1958 and 1965 in plebiscites in which he was the sole candidate, each time claiming unanimous or near-unanimous support. With few exceptions, the legislature did little more than approve Nasser's policies. As the legislature was made up almost entirely of government supporters, Nasser effectively held all governing power in the nation.

By the end of his presidency, employment and working conditions improved considerably, although poverty was still high in the country and substantial resources allocated for social welfare had been diverted to the war effort.

The national economy grew significantly through [agrarian reform](#), major modernization projects such as the Helwan steel works and the Aswan Dam, and

nationalization schemes such as that of the Suez Canal. However, the marked economic growth of the early 1960s took a downturn for the remainder of the decade, only recovering in 1970. Egypt experienced a "golden age" of culture during Nasser's presidency, according to historian Joel Gordon, particularly in film, television, theater, radio, literature, [fine arts](#), comedy, poetry, and music. Egypt under Nasser dominated the Arab world in these fields,^[299] producing cultural icons.

During Mubarak's presidency, [Nasserist](#) political parties began to emerge in Egypt, the first being the [Arab Democratic Nasserist Party](#) (ADNP). The party carried minor political influence, and splits between its members beginning in 1995 resulted in the gradual establishment of splinter parties, including [Hamdeen Sabahi's](#) 1997 founding of [Al-Karama](#). Sabahi came in third place during the [2012 presidential election](#). Nasserist activists were among the founders of [Kefaya](#), a major opposition force during Mubarak's rule.^[307] On 19 September 2012, four Nasserist parties (the ADNP, Karama, the [National Conciliation Party](#), and the Popular Nasserist Congress Party) merged to form the [United Nasserist Party](#).

Public image

Nasser was known for his accessibility and direct relationship with ordinary Egyptians. His availability to the public, despite assassination attempts against him, was unparalleled among his successors. A skilled orator, Nasser gave 1,359 speeches between 1953 and 1970, a record for any Egyptian head of state. Historian Elie Podeh wrote that a constant theme of Nasser's image was "his ability to represent Egyptian authenticity, in triumph or defeat". The national press also helped to foster his popularity and profile—more so after the nationalization of state media. Historian Tarek Osman wrote:

The interplay in the Nasser 'phenomenon' between genuine expression of popular feeling and state-sponsored propaganda may sometimes be hard to disentangle. But behind it lies a vital historical fact: that Gamal Abdel Nasser signifies the only truly Egyptian developmental project in the country's history since the fall of the Pharaonic state. There had been other projects ... But this was different—in origin, meaning and impact. For Nasser was a man of the Egyptian soil who had overthrown the Middle East's most established and sophisticated monarchy in a swift and bloodless move—to the acclaim of millions of poor, oppressed Egyptians—and ushered in a programme of 'social justice', 'progress and development', and 'dignity'.

While Nasser was increasingly criticized by Egyptian intellectuals following the Six-Day War and his death in 1970, the general public was persistently sympathetic both during and after Nasser's life. According to political scientist Mahmoud Hamad, writing in 2008, "nostalgia for Nasser is easily sensed in Egypt and all Arab countries today". General malaise in Egyptian society, particularly during the [Mubarak era](#),

augmented nostalgia for Nasser's presidency, which increasingly became associated with the ideals of national purpose, hope, social cohesion, and vibrant culture.^[302]

Until the present day, Nasser serves as an iconic figure throughout the Arab world, a symbol of Arab unity and dignity, and a towering figure in [modern Middle Eastern history](#). He is also considered a champion of social justice in Egypt. *Time* writes that despite his mistakes and shortcomings, Nasser "imparted a sense of personal worth and national pride that [Egypt and the Arabs] had not known for 400 years. This alone may have been enough to balance his flaws and failures."

Historian [Steven A. Cook](#) wrote in July 2013, "Nasser's heyday still represents, for many, the last time that Egypt felt united under leaders whose espoused principles met the needs of ordinary Egyptians." During the [Arab Spring](#), which resulted in a [revolution](#) in Egypt, photographs of Nasser were raised in Cairo and Arab capitals during anti-government demonstrations. According to journalist Lamis Andoni, Nasser had become a "symbol of Arab dignity" during the mass demonstrations.

Criticism

Sadat declared his intention to "continue the path of Nasser" in his 7 October 1970 presidential inauguration speech, but began to depart from Nasserist policies as his domestic position improved following the 1973 [October War](#). President Sadat's [Infitah](#) policy sought to open Egypt's economy for private investment. According to Heikal, ensuing anti-Nasser developments until the present day led to an Egypt "[half] at war with Abdel-Nasser, half [at war] with Anwar El-Sadat"

Nasser's Egyptian detractors considered him a dictator who thwarted democratic progress, imprisoned thousands of dissidents, and led a repressive administration responsible for numerous human rights violations. Islamists in Egypt, particularly members of the politically persecuted Brotherhood, viewed Nasser as oppressive, tyrannical, and demonic. Samer S. Shehata, who wrote an article on 'The Politics of Laughter: Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarek in Egyptian Political Jokes' noted that "with the new regime came the end of parliamentary politics and political freedoms, including the right to organize political parties, and freedoms of speech and the press". Liberal writer Tawfiq al-Hakim described Nasser as a "confused Sultan" who employed stirring rhetoric, but had no actual plan to achieve his stated goals.

Some of Nasser's [liberal](#) and Islamist critics in Egypt, including the founding members of the [New Wafd Party](#) and writer [Jamal Badawi](#), dismissed Nasser's popular appeal with the Egyptian masses during his presidency as being the product of successful manipulation and demagoguery. Egyptian political scientist Alaa al-Din Desouki blamed the 1952 revolution's shortcomings on Nasser's concentration of power, and

Egypt's lack of democracy on Nasser's political style and his government's limitations on [freedom of expression](#) and [political participation](#).^[331] American political scientist Mark Cooper asserted that Nasser's charisma and his direct relationship with the Egyptian people "rendered intermediaries (organizations and individuals) unnecessary". He opined that Nasser's legacy was a "guarantee of instability" due to Nasser's reliance on personal power and the absence of strong political institutions under his rule. Historian Abd al-Azim Ramadan wrote that Nasser was an irrational and irresponsible leader, blaming his inclination to solitary decision-making for Egypt's losses during the Suez War, among other events. [Miles Copeland, Jr.](#), a [Central Intelligence Agency](#) officer known for his close personal relationship with Nasser, said that the barriers between Nasser and the outside world have grown so thick that all but the information that attest to his infallibility, indispensability, and immortality has been filtered out.

[Zakaria Mohieddin](#), who was Nasser's vice president, said that Nasser gradually changed during his reign. He ceased consulting his colleagues and made more and more of the decisions himself. Although Nasser repeatedly said that a war with Israel will start at a time of his, or Arab, choosing, in 1967 he started a bluffing game "but a successful bluff means your opponent must not know which cards you are holding. In this case Nasser's opponent could see his hand in the mirror and knew he was only holding a pair of deuces" and Nasser knew that his army is not prepared yet. "All of this was out of character...His tendencies in this regard may have been accentuated by diabetes... That was the only rational explanation for his actions in 1967".

Regional leadership



[Jaafar Nimeiry](#) of Sudan (left), Nasser, and [Muammar Gaddafi](#) of [Libya](#) (right) at the [Tripoli Airport](#), 1969. Nimeiry and Gaddafi were influenced by Nasser's pan-Arabist ideas and the latter sought to succeed him as "leader of the Arabs".

Through his actions and speeches, and because he was able to symbolize the popular Arab will, Nasser inspired several nationalist revolutions in the Arab world. He defined the politics of his generation and communicated directly with the public masses of the

Arab world, bypassing the various heads of states of those countries—an accomplishment not repeated by other Arab leaders. The extent of Nasser's centrality in the region made it a priority for incoming Arab nationalist heads of state to seek good relations with Egypt, in order to gain popular legitimacy from their own citizens.

To varying degrees Nasser's [statist](#) system of government was continued in Egypt and emulated by virtually all Arab republics, namely Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, [Yemen](#), Sudan, and Libya. [Ahmed Ben Bella](#), Algeria's first president, was a staunch Nasserist. Abdullah al-Sallal drove out the king of North Yemen in the name of Nasser's pan-Arabism. Other coups influenced by Nasser included those that occurred in Iraq in July 1958 and Syria in 1963.^[345] Muammar Gaddafi, who overthrew the [Libyan monarchy](#) in 1969, considered Nasser his hero and sought to succeed him as "leader of the Arabs" Also in 1969, Colonel [Gaafar Nimeiry](#), a supporter of Nasser, took power in Sudan. The [Arab Nationalist Movement](#) (ANM) helped spread Nasser's pan-Arabist ideas throughout the Arab world, particularly among the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese, and in [South Yemen](#), the [Persian Gulf](#), and Iraq. While many regional heads of state tried to emulate Nasser, Podeh opined that the "[parochialism](#)" of successive Arab leaders "transformed imitation [of Nasser] into parody".



Gamal Abdel Nasser Mosque in Cairo, the site of his burial.



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About this Item

Title

- Gamal Abdel Nasser

Summary

- Photograph shows bust portrait of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Created / Published

- 1956 March 12.

Headings

- - Nasser, Gamal Abdel,--1918-1970
- - Presidents--1950-1960
- - Prime ministers--1950-1960

Headings

- Photographic prints--1950-1960.
- Publicity photographs--1950-1960.

Genre

- Publicity photographs--1950-1960
- Photographic prints--1950-1960

Notes

- - Title from news agency caption on item.
- - AP photo.
- - Forms part of: New York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection (Library of Congress).

Medium

- 1 photographic print.

Call Number/Physical Location

- NYWTS - BIOG--Nasser, Gamal Abdel--Egypt Premier [item] [P&P]

Source Collection

- New York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection (Library of Congress)

Repository

- Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/pp.print>

Digital Id

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Additional Metadata Formats

- [MARCXML Record](#)
- [MODS Record](#)
- [Dublin Core Record](#)



Quotable QUOTES !

Quotes	Concepts
I have decided to resign totally and finally all official positions. I shall return to private life.	Egypt; Retirement; War; Private Life; Resignations; Six Day War; Private Citizen; War & Peace; Abdication of Power; End of Career; Exit from Public Life; Final Decision; Goodbye to Public Service; Last Day; Leaving Office; Termination of Employment
If the refugees return to Israel, Israel will cease to exist.	Citizens, Citizenship; Displacement; International Law; Israel; Occupation; Palestine, Palestinians; Refugees; Emigrants; Ethnic Cleansing; Humanitarian Aid; Repatriation; Resettlement; Right of Return; Self Determination, Self-Determination; Cease To Exist; Citizenship & Patriotism; Palestinian Rights; Political Conflict; Refugee Crisis
If the Western Powers disavow our rights and ridicule and despise us, we Arabs must teach them to respect us and take us seriously.	Ego, Egotists, Egotism; Egypt; Islam; Moslems; Respect; Ridicule; Rights; Sovereignty; The West; Despise, Despicability, Despising; Mutual Respect; Self Determination, Self-Determination; Self Respect; Western Imperialism; Western Powers; Arab, Arabs; Self-Respect; Politics, Politicians & Political Campaigning & Fund Raising; Arab Dignity; Cultural Respect; International Recognition; Political Autonomy
Israel's development of nuclear capability would be a cause for war, no matter how suicidal it would be for us.	Arms Race; Atomic Bomb; Defense; Egypt; Energy; Israel; Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Non-Proliferation; Atomic / Nuclear Weapons; Dimona; For War; International Security; Middle East; Middle East Conflict; Mutually Assured Destruction; Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear Deterents; Nuclear Disarmament; Nuclear Power; Preemptive Strike; Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Weapons & Energy; Nuclear Arms Control; Regional Instability
The genius of you Americans is that you never made clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves.	America; Blunders; Egypt; Incompetence; Insults, Rebukes; Stupidity; Miscalculations; Missteps; Compliments, Insults & Rebukes; Foreign Policy, World & International Affairs; Complex Errors; Poor Judgement; Reckless Actions; Strategic Mistakes; Unfortunate Choices; Unwise Decisions
Which one of you will avenge your father's death by killing Jews?	Anti-Semitic, Anti-Semitism; Discrimination; Egypt; Hatred; Israel; Justice; Killing, Murder, Assassination; Persecution; Revenge; Terrorism, Terrorists; Vengeance; Arab-Israeli Conflict, Arab-Jewish Conflict; Jew, Jews, Judaism; Retribution; Terrorism; Blood Feud

Women must enjoy equal rights with men. The remaining shackles that hamper their freedom must be removed so that they can participate constructively and profoundly in shaping the life of the country.	Egypt; Equal Rights; Equality; Women; Gender Discrimination; Gender Equality, Gender Inequality; Women's Liberation; Women's Rights; Women's Suffrage; Patriarchy; Equality & Equal Opportunity; Female Representation; Gender Equity; Women's Empowerment
You wouldn't sell me arms. I had to buy them where I could.	Arms; Arms Race; Boycotts; Egypt; Intergovernmental Relations; Israel; Russia; Arab-Israeli Conflict, Arab-Jewish Conflict; Arms Control; Arms Dealers; Arms Embargo; Arms Sales; Gun Smuggling; Middle East; Russian; Foreign Policy, World & International Affairs; Arms Export; Arms Importation; Arms Trade Regulations; Illegal Arms Trade; Weapon Trafficking
Events are not a matter of chance.	Chance, Fortune, Luck, Probability; Calculated Risk; Conscious Choice; Controlled Circumstance; Deliberate Plan; Foreseeable Consequence; Inevitable Result; Intentional Action; Planned Outcome; Predetermined Outcome; Preordained Fate
He who can not support himself, can not take his own decision.	Independence; Self Control, Self-Control; Autonomy; Self Determination, Self-Determination; Self Reliance; Self Sufficiency, Self-Sufficiency; Self-Reliance; Self Empowerment; Self-Governance; Self-Support; Self-Sustenance
I have been a conspirator for so long that I mistrust all around me.	Deception; Distrust; Paranoia; Secrecy; Suspicion; Betrayal; Cynicism; Isolation; Vigilance; Cautiousness
People do not want words - they want the sound of battle - the battle of destiny.	Courage; Struggle; Fate; Battle Of; Conflict Resolution; Triumph; Victory; Conflict; Conflict Management; Destiny's Call
The genius of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make the rest of us wonder at the possibility that we might be missing something.	Complexity, Complexities; Deception; Perception; Sophistication; Cunning; Insight; Misleading; Strategic Thinking; Subterfuge; Intricacy
There is no longer a way out of our present situation except by forging a road toward our objective, violently and by force,	Desperation; Determination; Struggle; Triumph; Victory; Conflict; Sacrifice; Overcoming Adversity

over a sea of blood and under a horizon blazing with fire.	
They defended the grains of sand in the desert to the last drop of their blood.	Bravery, Valor; Courage; Determination; Honor; Patriotism; Devotion; Selflessness; Sacrifice
What was taken by force, can only be restored by force.	Activism; Liberation; Oppression; Repression; Tyranny; Uprising; Rebellion, Revolution, Insurgency & Resistance

